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Protecting the Viability of the Small Donor in 
Modern Elections 
Ben Miller∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION
Campaign finance reform stands as one of the most 
important issues in today’s modern elections.  From national to 
municipal contests, the influx of large donations places wealthy 
individuals—and interests—at odds with the average voter.  
Over the years, volumes of academic and legislative reforms 
have been proposed that encompass a wide range of electoral 
subject matter.  From Citizens United to Federal Elections 
Commission (FEC) control mechanisms, solutions on how to 
change our campaign finance regulatory regime cover a large 
and diverse area of law and policy.  However, the central theme 
throughout these reforms is maximizing transparency and 
curbing the undue influence of candidates through large 
donations. 
The vast majority of current large-scale campaign efforts, 
from mayoral and gubernatorial through presidential races, 
actively seek out support from wealthy individuals and 
institutions.  Although this alone does not suggest that a 
candidate is beholden to those who provide the most monetary 
support, it discourages candidates and parties from increasing 
their constituent base to include large numbers of everyday 
voters.  In the eyes of reformers, the focus of modern campaigns 
has gone from creating policy that benefits the population to 
creating policy benefiting those that offer the candidate the most 
∗ I would like to thank Professors Vandenberg, Rubin, Serkin, and Cheng for their
guidance during the writing and publication process of this work.  Additionally, I would 
also like to thank my speechwriting and policy colleagues on the Clinton campaign for 
inspiring me to write about campaign finance.  Family and friends, you know who you are 
and I am indebted to the patience and support you have shown me time and again. 
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economic utility.1  In response to this, reformers have offered a 
number of solutions that aim to harmonize the policies proposed 
by a given candidate and the policies needed by a given 
represented population. 
One of the current, but often overlooked, reform proposals 
is the creation of matching systems for small donors.  Given the 
rise of small donors during the 2016 presidential election, such 
programs have taken on new importance.2  Through a mixture of 
public and private funds, these small-donor apparatuses aim to 
add greater diversity to a campaign’s finances while minimizing 
the sway that large donors have on candidates.  These systems, 
however, have serious practical and constitutional flaws. 
This Article will analyze the strengths and weaknesses of 
small-donor matching programs in modern elections.  Although 
other campaign finance reforms will be mentioned, the focus of 
discussion will be on proposed legislation and academic 
solutions specific to small-donor matching.  These programs do 
not exist in a bubble detached from larger reform efforts, but 
they do occupy a wholly unique area of policy that, at times, 
intersects with greater notions of American law.  Part II of this 
Article will introduce the subject of campaign finance in greater 
detail.  Part III will discuss recent legislation and will analyze 
their efficacy both practically and constitutionally.  Part IV will 
include a broader policy discussion on small-donor matching, 
and Part V will conclude the Article. 
II. BACKGROUND
A. Early Reforms
Prospective candidates for elected office have engaged in 
illegal campaign activity since the very beginning of our 
country’s history.  In order to secure a seat in the Virginia House 
of Burgesses in 1757 (the first democratically elected legislature 
in the American British colonies), George Washington 
distributed over 140 gallons of beer, cider, rum, and other 
1. See Martin Gilens & Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics:
Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens 12 PERSP. POL. 564, 564-81 (2014). 
2. See Summary Data for Bernie Sanders, 2016 Cycle, OPEN SECRETS,
https://www.opensecrets.org/pres16/candidate.php?id=N00000528 
[https://perma.cc/7V7V-4DBV]. 
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alcohol to his constituents.3  At the time, there were only 391 
voters in his district.4  Once elected to office, the legislature 
immediately passed a law prohibiting such behavior in future 
elections.5  When James Madison ran for a seat in Virginia’s 
House of Delegates in 1777, he vowed not to bribe voters with 
“the corrupting influence of spirituous liquors, and other 
treats . . . .”6  He failed to win election.7  Although such behavior 
was illegal, it was often supported and encouraged.8  During the 
years prior to the rise of Tammany Hall-era New York City (not 
to mention the era itself), campaign finance violations were 
alleged against mayoral candidates and other city officials.9  The 
city’s 1838 mayoral election included vote buying and other 
forms of illegal support solicitation.10  Even in today’s elections, 
local candidates have utilized similar tactics.11 
As illustrated above, early illegal campaign finance activity 
(pre–1854, the New York City mayoral election of Fernando 
Wood) centered around influencing the voter.  The first 
3. Lisa Bramen, Swilling the Planters with Bumbo: When Booze Bought Elections,
SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Oct. 20, 2010), http://www.smithsonianmag.com/arts-
culture/swilling-the-planters-with-bumbo-when-booze-bought-elections-102758236/?no-ist 
[https://perma.cc/Z6DN-P942 ] (quoting DANIEL OKRENT, LAST CALL: THE RISE AND 
FALL OF PROHIBITION 47 (2010)). 
4. Victor W. Geraci, Campaign Finance Reform Historical Timeline, CONN.
NETWORK, 
http://www.ctn.state.ct.us/civics/campaign_finance/Support%20Materials/CTN%20CFR%
20Timeline.pdf [https://perma.cc/8LYP-RWDX]. 
5. Jaime Fuller, From George Washington to Shaun McCutcheon: A Brief-ish
History of Campaign Finance Reform, WASH. POST (Apr. 3, 2014, 9:15 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2014/04/03/a-history-of-campaign-
finance-reform-from-george-washington-to-shaun-mccutcheon/ [https://perma.cc/7QTZ-
UUF6]. 
6. Nat’l Archives, James Madison: Defeated for Election to Virginia House of
Delegates, [24 April] 1777, FOUNDERS ONLINE, 
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-01-02-0062 [https://perma.cc/JAF6-
HEAF]. 
7. Bramen, supra note 3.
8. Id.
9. See Library of Cong., Henry R. Robinson: The Last Card. Tip Overthrown, LIBR.
CONGRESS: ONLINE CATALOG, https://lccn.loc.gov/2008661395 [https://perma.cc/S9ZR-
BMTJ]. 
10. See Geraci, supra note 4; Library of Cong., supra note 9.
11. Melissa Brown, Sorority Offered Free Drinks to Members to Vote in Tuscaloosa
City Board of Education Race, AL.COM: BLOG (Aug. 28, 2013, 4:52 PM), 
http://blog.al.com/tuscaloosa/2013/08/sorority_offered_free_drinks_t.html 
[https://perma.cc/KCA2-7TPG]. 
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campaign finance reform legislation, the 1876 Naval 
Appropriations Bill, aimed to stop the illicit exhortation of naval 
yard workers by banning campaign solicitations from them.12  
However, by the mid-1800s, the flow of money reversed and 
influence started to come not from public officials but from 
wealthy citizens.  Machine politics dominated by private 
individuals exerting control over office holders caused Mark 
Twain to remark in a speech given on the 4th of July 1876, “I 
think I can say, and say with pride that we have some 
legislatures that bring higher prices than any in the world.”13  
Four years earlier Jay Cooke, a wealthy railroad financier and 
grandfather of investment banking, contributed $50,000 to 
Ulysses S. Grant’s presidential campaign, prompting one 
historian to note, “never before was a candidate placed under 
such great obligation to men of wealth.”14 
Government reforms were slow to catch up.  In 1883, the 
United States Congress passed the Civil Service Reform Act 
(Pendleton Act).15  This extended the protections in the earlier 
1876 Naval Appropriations Bill to all government employees.16  
The Pendleton Act was passed, in part, to stop the firing of 
federal employees that did not contribute campaign donations 
during election years.17  While this solved the problem of buying 
votes (and the inverse, buying of offices by federal employees), 
it did little to curb the influence of wealthy private individuals.  
By 1896, presidential campaigns started to seek larger donations 
from private institutions.18  William McKinley, succeeding 
12. Ctr. for Pub. Integrity, Important Dates: Federal Campaign Finance Legislation,
CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (May 19, 2014, 12:19 PM), 
https://www.publicintegrity.org/2004/03/25/5852/important-dates-federal-campaign-
finance-legislation [https://perma.cc/5E24-WQ4D]. 
13.  Mark Twain: Speech July 4, 1873, TWAIN QUOTES, 
http://www.twainquotes.com/Legislators.html [https://perma.cc/J5NR-M8NN]. 
14. JASON GRUMET, CITY OF RIVALS: RESTORING THE GLORIOUS MESS OF 
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 43 (1st ed. 2014). 
15.  Transcript of Pendleton Act (1883), OUR DOCUMENTS, 
https://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=true&doc=48&page=transcript 
[https://perma.cc/W4YY-G2ZL]. 
16. Univ. of Hous., Annotation to The Pendleton Act (1883), DIGITAL HIST.,
http://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/disp_textbook.cfm?smtID=3&psid=1098 
[https://perma.cc/2MNQ-CLY4]. 
17. Id.
18. MICHAEL NELSON, GUIDE TO THE PRESIDENCY AND THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH,
289 (5th ed. 2013). 
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Grover Cleveland, ended his campaign with over $7 million 
worth of expenditures.19  In comparison, William Jennings 
Bryan (McKinley’s opponent), had only raised approximately 
$650,000.20  The driving force behind McKinley’s success was 
soliciting donations from private corporations.21  McKinley’s 
campaign manager, Alonzo Hanna, had encouraged corporations 
to donate “according to [their] stake in the general prosperity of 
the country.”22 
In 1907, The Tillman Act became the first federal 
legislation to directly address this growing problem.23  The Act, 
advocated for a year earlier by President Theodore Roosevelt, 
barred contributions from corporations and other financial 
entities.24  Interestingly, Roosevelt had first called for a public 
financing system (a component of later small-donor matching 
programs!) alongside a ban on corporate donations, but the bill 
was later watered down in the House and Senate.25  A few years 
following the Tillman Act, Congress passed robust legislation, 
the Federal Corrupt Practices Act, that set spending limits for 
congressional candidates and created the first requirements for 
financial campaign disclosures.26  However, in 1921 the 
Supreme Court, in Newberry v. United States, found the 
majority of the act and later amendments unconstitutional, 
including spending limit restrictions.27 
Running counter to these early reforms in campaign finance 
came a massive expansion of the American voter base in 1913 
and again in 1920.  The Seventeenth Amendment, calling for the 
direct election of U.S. Senators, expanded the electorate by 
19. Geraci, supra note 4.
20. Id.
21. NELSON, supra note 18, at 289.
22. Id. at 372, note 93.
23. BROOKINGS INSTITUTION PRESS, CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM: A
SOURCEBOOK 36 (Anthony Corrado et al. eds., 1997). 
24. Id.
25. See Fed. Election Comm’n, Public Funding of Presidential Elections, FED.
ELECTION COMMISSION (2017), http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/pubfund.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/EG2G-ZRDU]. 
26. See Cullen Couch, Citizens United: First Amendment Protection or Pandora’s
Box?, UVA LAW. (2012), 
http://www.law.virginia.edu/html/alumni/uvalawyer/spr12/citizens.htm 
[https://perma.cc/5X4Y-2HUG]. 
27. Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232, 243-57 (1921).
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vesting the power to elect Senators with voters, instead of state 
legislatures.28  By doing so, the Amendment also created a 
stronger protection against institutional practices aimed at 
buying senate seats through the influence of such legislatures.29  
With the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment seven years 
later, the American voter base was again massively expanded.30  
Such a rapid growth of voters necessarily increased campaign 
financing efforts.  While Congress tried to pass further reforms 
in the face of a rise in campaign contributions by amending the 
Federal Corrupt Practices Act, little progress was made.31  In 
fact, enforcement mechanisms within the legislation were so lax 
that Lyndon B. Johnson once described the Act as “more 
loophole than law.”32 
B. The Rise of the Political Action Committee (PAC)
By the mid-1930s, the birth of unionized labor brought a
new influx of cash to state and federal political campaigns.  One 
of the first major unions to become directly involved in the 
political arena at this time was the Congress of Industrial 
Organizations (CIO).33  Up until 1943, labor unions could donate 
directly to political campaigns and party organizations; however, 
with the passing of the Smith-Connally Act that same year, 
direct union donations became illegal.34  Additionally, other 
congressional legislation in the 1930s and 1940s restricted the 
level of participation by federal employees in elections, many of 
whom were unionized.35 
These new restrictions forced unions to seek other ways in 
which to advance their interests and policies in elections.  In 
28. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
29. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
30. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
31. See CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM: A SOURCEBOOK, supra note 23, at 29.
32. John T. Woolley & Gerhard Peters, Lyndon B. Johnson: Statement by the
President upon Signing the Foreign Investors Tax Act and the Presidential Election Fund 
Act (November 13, 1966), AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=28030 [https://perma.cc/8KME-6GCY]. 
33. See Geraci, supra note 4.
34. See CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM: A SOURCEBOOK, supra note 23, at 30.
35. See 5 U.S.C. § 7323(a)-(c) (2012).  For concurrent campaign finance legislation,
see Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-333, 49 Stat. 803 (1935), 
repealed by Public Utility Holding Company Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 
972 (2005) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 16451 (2016)). 
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1944, a year following the passage of the Smith-Connally Act, 
the CIO established the first PAC in American history.36  In 
many ways, the first CIO PAC gave rise to our modern system 
of PACs and super PACs.  However, additional federal 
legislation was created soon after the establishment of the CIO 
PAC to further curb influence of private money in federal 
elections.37  The Taft-Hartley Act, passed in 1947, created a 
permanent ban on contributions from unions, corporations, and 
financial institutions in federal elections.38  This essentially 
quashed further creation of PACs by unions and other parties.  It 
was not until 1971 that PACs were again recognized as 
legitimate campaign finance vehicles.39 
C. The Federal Elections Campaign Act, the Supreme
Court, and the Modern Landscape of Campaign
Finance 
In 1971, the U.S. Congress passed its first comprehensive 
campaign reform legislation, the Federal Election Campaign Act 
(FECA).40  Interestingly enough, FECA was originally signed 
into law by then President Richard Nixon,41 and the Act later 
used a rationale against him for impeachment.42  While the 
original text focused primarily on heightened campaign 
disclosure requirements, by 1974—in response to the Watergate 
scandal—the Act was amended to include contribution and 
spending limits.43 
36. Ctr. for Pub. Integrity, supra note 12.
37. See 29 U.S.C. § 141(b) (2006).
38. Farhana Hossain, Changes in the Way Corporations Can Finance Campaigns,
N.Y. Times (Jan. 21, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2010/01/19/us/politics/0120-scotus-
campaign.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/NL2Y-J4R6]. 
39. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, § 301(d), 86 Stat.
3, 11 (1972). 
40. Federal Election Campaign Act § 101, 86 Stat. at 3.
41. John T. Woolley & Gerhard Peters, Richard Nixon: Statement on Signing the
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (February 7, 1972), AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3725 [https://perma.cc/75BF-NNL2]. 
42. Nixon Campaign Violation, LODI NEWS-SENTINEL, Mar. 13, 1973, at 1;
Overview, Part 3: The Past Reforms – A Look at the Laws, WASH. POST. (1998), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/special/campfin/intro3.htm 
[https://perma.cc/44EM-QMJA]. 
43. Overview, Part 3: The Past Reforms—A Look at the Laws, supra note 42.
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The most important development to arise out of the post-
Watergate 1974 amendments was the creation of the Federal 
Elections Commission (FEC).44  The FEC remains the principal 
governmental organization for campaign finance enforcement.45  
Another, less heralded, campaign finance reform that set the 
stage for future small-donor matching programs (discussed in 
subsequent sections), was the 1971 Revenue Act.46  The 
Revenue Act established a public financing system for 
presidential elections based on income tax.47  It also included tax 
credits for contributions (although such credits were eventually 
removed out of the Act years later).48  Today, the public 
financing established under the Revenue Act appears on every 
U.S. income tax return form as the “Presidential Election 
Campaign Fund” checkoff.49 
By the mid-1970s, FECA had fallen under intense judicial 
scrutiny.50  The earlier 1974 amendments centering around 
campaign spending limits became a central battleground 
between the government and a wide variety of Senators and 
activist organizations encompassing both sides of the political 
spectrum.51  In 1976, the landmark Buckley v. Valeo decision 
gave the Supreme Court an opportunity to directly analyze how 
campaigns interact with the country’s basic constitutional 
guarantees.52  In its decision, the Court determined that limiting 
the spending of candidates, political parties, and other groups 
(including PACs) violated the First Amendment protection on 
free speech.53  However, the Court did uphold limits on 
44. Fed. Election Comm’n, About the FEC, FED. ELECTION COMMISSION,
http://www.fec.gov/about.shtml [https://perma.cc/DC4D-6U3S]. 
45. Id.
46. Fed. Election Comm’n, Public Funding of Presidential Elections, supra note 25.
47. Id.
48. Ctr. for Pub. Integrity, supra note 12.
49. Fed. Election Comm’n, The $3 Tax Checkoff, FED. ELECTION COMMISSION
(1993), http://www.fec.gov/info/checkoff.htm [https://perma.cc/8CGW-8C9R]. 
50. Fed. Election Comm’n, Court Case Abstracts, FED. ELECTION COMMISSION,
http://www.fec.gov/law/litigation_CCA_B.shtml [https://perma.cc/2TLG-7WKX] 
(providing a succinct list of federal court cases—full links to each case can be found on the 
webpage); see also Rebecca Curry, Making Law with Lawsuits: Understanding Judicial 
Review in Campaign Finance Policy, 46 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 389, 440-41 (2013). 
51. Brief for Appellants, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (Nos. 75-436 and 75-
437), 1975 WL 173792, at *14-25. 
52. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 6, 11 (1976).
53. Id. at 19-20.
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maximum contributions and, importantly, upheld a public 
financing system in which candidates voluntarily participate.54  
The requirements placed on candidates who opt into a financing 
system based on public funds could, without violating the First 
Amendment, have their spending capped.55  Such a recognition 
of alternative campaign financing mechanisms further laid the 
foundation for future small-donor matching programs.56  
Subsequent to the decision in Buckley, Congress amended 
FECA to comply with the Supreme Court ruling.57  In 1979, 
further amendments were added that officially recognized the 
use of donations to political parties, PACs, and other non-
affiliated organizations.58 
During the 1980s and early 1990s, campaign finance 
reform stalled.59  Bills killed in Congress, despite receiving 
widespread support, include a bill calling for strict campaign 
financing restrictions; a bill and constitutional amendment 
calling for spending limits; and spending limits on PACs.  In 
1992, then President George Bush vetoed the Congressional 
Campaign Spending Limit and Election Reform Act.60  This act 
would have created a system of partial public funding for 
candidates who chose to agree to voluntary campaign spending 
limits.61  Additionally, the bill called for a ban on soft money 
(contributions to political parties and PACs, as opposed to direct 
contributions to candidates) donations to presidential 
campaigns.62  Congress eventually failed to override the vetoed 
bill.63 
Interestingly enough, in 1990, the Supreme Court in Austin 
v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce found restrictions on corporate
54. Id. at 143.
55. Id. at 29.
56. Id. at 128.  For the discerning law student, they will remember Buckley v. Valeo
as the constitutional law case that touched on Congress’s appointment powers. 
57. Geraci, supra note 4.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. See S. 3 – Congressional Campaign Spending Limit and Election Reform Act of
1992, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/102nd-congress/senate-bill/3
[https://perma.cc/P75X-SRSZ] (showing that the Senate failed to override the presidential
veto).
61. See 138 CONG. REC. 8999 (1992).
62. See 138 CONG. REC. 9009 (1992).
63. See 138 CONG. REC. 11,146 (1992).
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expenditures to be constitutional and not a violation of free 
speech.64  In the decision, the majority opinion noted that 
“[c]orporate wealth can unfairly influence elections . . . .”65  This 
decision was ultimately overruled by Citizens United v. FEC.66 
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, a flurry of campaign 
finance legislation was pushed through Congress, with varying 
levels of success.  In 1999, Representative Asa Hutchinson [R-
AR-3] proposed a bill that banned soft money contributions 
while raising hard-money limits.67  That same year, 
Representative Bill Thomas [R-CA-21] proposed FEC reforms 
and a wholesale ban on foreign political donations.68  A 
bipartisan bill originating in the Senate called for a ban on soft 
money and restrictions on campaign advertising.69  This era, 
however, was not without counter-legislation.  Representative 
John Doolittle [R-CA-4] offered a bill that removed all 
contribution limits first established under FECA.70 
The greatest legislation on campaign finance reform, the 
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA or McCain-Feingold 
Act), set the stage for the judicial showdowns of the late 2000s.71  
The McCain-Feingold Act prohibited soft money contributions 
to political parties and revised FECA spending limits.72  
Additionally, the Act addressed advocacy advertisements, 
dubbed “electioneering communications” by for profit and non-
profit corporations.73  In 2003, after facing criticism from both 
political parties, the Act’s bans on soft money and restrictions 
on political ads survived a Supreme Court challenge in 
McConnell v. FEC.74 
64. See 494 U.S. 652, 655 (1990).
65. Id. at 660.
66. See 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010).
67. Campaign Integrity Act of 1999, H.R. 1867, 106th Cong. (introducing the bill to
the House on May 19, 1999). 
68. Campaign Reform and Election Integrity Act of 1999, H.R. 2668, 106th Cong.
(introducing the bill to the House on August 2, 1999). 
69. Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act of 1999, H.R. 417, 106th Cong. §
101(a), 308(1)(A)-(B) (introducing the bill to the House on September 16, 1999). 
70. Citizen Legislature and Political Freedom Act, H.R. 1922, 106th Cong. § 2
(introducing the bill to the House, May 25, 1999). 
71. See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 107 Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116
Stat. 81 (2002). 
72. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act §§ 304, 323, 116 Stat. at 82, 97.
73. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act § 201(f)(3), 116 Stat. at 89.
74. 540 U.S. 93, 159, 202-03 (2003).
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The McCain-Feingold Act continued to face a variety of 
judicial challenges leading up to the 2010 Supreme Court 
decision in Citizens United.  In 2006, the Supreme Court found 
Vermont’s campaign donation caps to be an unconstitutional 
violation of free speech.75  A year later, the Court rolled back 
political advertising restrictions in FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, 
Inc.76  Although Wis. Right to Life has largely been replaced by 
Citizens United, the Court did raise important First Amendment 
concerns that may impact the efficacy of future alternative 
campaign financing programs.77  Additionally in 2008, the 
Court’s decision in Davis v. FEC reaffirmed the supremacy of 
the First Amendment over legislative restrictions on campaign 
contribution limits.78  Specifically, a provision in the McCain-
Feingold Act, called the “Millionaire’s Amendment,” would 
have allowed the raising of the contribution caps for non-self-
funded candidates.79  The aim of this provision was to empower 
candidates without considerable personal financial support the 
ability to compete with wealthy individuals whose self-funding 
subverted the rationale behind contribution limits.80  This idea, 
realized in the McCain-Feingold Act, is an essential rationale 
behind today’s small-donor matching programs. 
In 2010, the most damaging blow to the McCain-Feingold 
Act was dealt by Citizens United.  In a 5-4 split, the Supreme 
Court held that the government could not restrict the campaign 
spending of corporations, unions, and other organizations such 
as PACs.81  By arguing that the political advertising restrictions 
in the Act were a violation of the First Amendment, the Court 
extended the rationale of Wis. Right to Life to corporate 
expenditures as a whole.82  Later cases and FEC advisory 
opinions have further solidified the holding in Citizens United.  
SpeechNOW.org v. FEC and the FEC’s advisory opinion in Club 
75. Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 231, 246 (2006).
76. 551 U.S. 449, 481 (2007).
77. Id. at 456, 475.
78. 554 U.S. 724, 738 (2008).
79. Id. at 729.
80. Id. at 749 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
81. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010).
82. Id. at 319.
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for Growth loosened the barriers on donation limitations.83  In 
2011, an FEC advisory opinion for Commonsense Ten, which 
built on the opinion in Club for Growth, allowed for 
contributions outside of “restricted classes” that essentially led 
to the rise of the modern “super Pac”.84  Further advisory 
opinions and lower court decisions have extended First 
Amendment protections on political speech through campaign 
donations.85  Later Supreme Court decisions have also eroded 
lingering attempts at campaign finance reform.  In 2011, the 
Court found that an alternative financing program utilizing 
public funds to match spending of non-program participating 
candidates in Arizona was an unconstitutional restriction on free 
speech.86  Most recently, in McCutcheon v. FEC, the Supreme 
Court held that FECA restrictions on aggregated individual 
contribution amounts violated the First Amendment.87  This 
current landscape, although appearing hostile towards the 
creation of the alternative financing system, has set the stage for 
a resurgent discussion on small-donor matching programs.  
Along with the 2015-2016 presidential election, federal small-
donor matching programs are being considered once again as 
viable mechanisms for campaign finance reform.88 
III. SMALL-DONOR MATCHING
A. Rationale
Support for small-donor matching programs as an 
alternative to traditional campaign finance reforms centers 
around a number of policy rationales.  The programs themselves 
83. 599 F.3d 686, 696 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, Keating v. FEC, 562 U.S. 1003
(2010); Club for Growth, Inc., Fed. Election Comm’n Advisory Op. 2010-09 (2010), 
http://saos.fec.gov/aodocs/AO%202010-09.pdf [https://perma.cc/LA6V-D3LU]. 
84. Commonsense Ten, Fed. Election Comm’n Advisory Op. 2010-11 (2010),
http://saos.fec.gov/aodocs/AO%202010-11.pdf [https://perma.cc/AET4-BYGX]. 
85. Nat’l Def. Comm., Fed. Election Comm’n Advisory Op. 2012-27 (2012),
http://saos.fec.gov/aodocs/AO%202012-27.pdf [https://perma.cc/2EBB-LS6Y]; see also 
Carey v. FEC, 864 F. Supp. 2d 57, 61-62 (D.D.C. 2012). 
86. Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721, 754-55
(2011). 
87. 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1462 (2014).
88. See Government by the People Act of 2015, H.R. 20, 114th Cong. (2015); Fair
Elections Now Act, S. 1538, 114th Cong. (2015). 
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match private small-dollar donations with public funds.89  In 
order to receive these public funds, a candidate must first qualify 
and then voluntarily opt into the program.90  In light of this, the 
policy rationales of these programs attempt to encompass both 
voters and candidates. 
First, using public funds to support those seeking elected 
office is nothing new.  Public funds remove the steep financial 
barriers faced by many candidates.  Those without high levels of 
wealth often cannot compete with those that have great personal 
and institutional financial backing.  Second, small-donor 
matching systems attempt to remove the influence of large 
money donations.  By utilizing majority public funds, candidates 
are less likely to appear beholden to the interests of big ticket 
donors.  A third rationale, one that focuses more on how 
campaigns spend the money they receive, is that a level 
advertising field means an equal opportunity for the public to 
hear each candidate’s message.  Additionally, on a broader level, 
small-donor matching programs can raise the diversity of 
contributing donors. 
B. Current Legislation
The idea of federal small-donor matching programs first 
originated in legislation during the run-up to and in the wake of 
Citizens United.91  Legislation proposed in the 114th Congress 
(2015-2016) has mirrored, built on, and further refined these 
earlier attempts.92  Two bills were proposed during this cycle: 
the Government by the People Act (GBPA), and the Fair 
Elections Now Act (FENA).  Although both have iterations in 
former legislation, these new acts have been refined in light of 
McCutcheon.93  Both the GBPA and FENA have gained 
89. Glenn Hudson, Comment, Think Small: The Future of Public Financing After
Arizona Free Enterprise, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 413, 429 (2012). 
90. James Sample, The Last Rites of Public Campaign Financing?, 92 NEB. L. REV.
349, 371 (2013). 
91. See Government by the People Act of 2014, H.R. 20, 113th Cong. (2014); Fair
Elections Now Act, H.R. 6116, 111th Cong. (2010). 
92. See Government by the People Act of 2015, H.R. 20, 114th Cong. (2015); Fair
Elections Now Act, S. 1538, 114th Cong. (2015). 
93. Compare supra note 91 (allowing minimal amounts of small-donor matching),
with supra note 92 (expanding small-donor matching programs in ways such as increasing 
the matching percentage and voucher programs). 
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middling support in the House and Senate.94  More importantly, 
both seek to establish a voluntary system in which candidates for 
federal office, after receiving a benchmark level of small-donor 
support (somewhere between approximately 750-2000 unique 
donations), opt-in to receive matching public funds while 
abiding by stricter financial restrictions.95 
The GBPA’s small-donor matching program centers around 
a voucher system.  Any individual, at his or her request, receives 
a voucher named the “My Voice Voucher” from a state body 
created by the Act.96  This body is tasked with running the 
program, much like a state election board.97  With a total value 
of fifty dollars, the voucher enables an individual to contribute 
to qualified candidates in five dollar increments.98  Additionally, 
an individual can revoke a voucher within two days of 
submitting it.99  Using the voucher in this way would be 
considered an appropriate political contribution under FECA.100  
Individuals who participate in the voucher system receive a fifty 
percent tax credit of the amount of voucher spent.101 
On the candidate side, the GBPA sets out restrictions for 
those who qualify and choose to opt into the small-donor 
matching program.  For instance, candidates participating in the 
program cannot set up joint fundraising committees with 
separate entities other than entities already associated with the 
candidate.102  This essentially removes the ability to jointly 
fundraise with organizations such as the DNC and RNC.  The 
GPBA also prohibits candidates from associating with PACs and 
comes with enforcement mechanisms, including civil penalties 
94. See Cosponsors: H.R. 20 – 114th Congress (2015-2016), CONGRESS.GOV,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/20/cosponsors 
[https://perma.cc/4PWR-MMAR]; Cosponsors: S. 1538 – 114th Congress (2015-2016), 
CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/senate-
bill/1538/cosponsors [https://perma.cc/EKX5-77B6]. 
95. See Government by the People Act of 2015, H.R. 20, 114th Cong. §§ 512, 531,
532 (2015); Fair Elections Now Act, S. 1538, 114th Cong. § 511, 512, 521, 523 (2015). 
96. Government by the People Act of 2015, H.R. 20, at § 112(a)(1)(A).
97. Government by the People Act of 2015, H.R. 20, at §§ 112(c), 113.
98. Government by the People Act of 2015, H.R. 20, at § 112(a)(1).
99. Government by the People Act of 2015, H.R. 20, at § 112(b).
100. Government by the People Act of 2015, H.R. 20, at §§ 101, 112.
101. Government by the People Act of 2015, H.R. 20, 114th Cong. § 101 (2015).
102. Government by the People Act of 2015, H.R. 20, at § 521(e).
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for those in contravention.103  Additionally, the Act places 
requirements on television and radio broadcasters that require 
easier access for candidates and political parties.104  The main 
draw for candidates to opt into the GPBA is its public funds 
matching system.  A candidate, after reaching certain 
benchmarks, can receive up to 600% additional matched funds 
based on a total of small-donor contributions.105  This percentage 
rises for those who seek to agree to even greater restrictions.106 
Unlike the GBPA, FENA employs a more simplistic 
system.107  For the average voter, donating to a campaign would 
proceed without vouchers.108  However, much like the GBPA, 
taxpayers would receive a fifty percent tax credit on 
contributions up to a specified amount.109  For participating 
candidates, restrictions and matching benefits effectively mirror 
those of the GBPA.110  The striking difference is that FENA 
employs a voucher system for media advertising.111  Here, each 
candidate is offered a set amount of money to spend on 
advertising per district.112 
Other activity surrounding small-donor matching programs 
in Congress has not come in the form of proposed legislation, 
but rather resolutions.113  Although these resolutions are focused 
more broadly on campaign finance reform at large, both 
specifically advocate the implementation of these programs.114  
The resolutions, however, have gained little support among 
other congressional members.115 
103. Government by the People Act of 2015, H.R. 20, at §§ 521(f), 544.
104. Government by the People Act of 2015, H.R. 20, at §§ 401(c), (h).
105. Government by the People Act of 2015, H.R. 20, at § 501(b)(1).
106. Government by the People Act of 2015, H.R. 20, at § 501(b)(2).
107. See Fair Elections Now Act, S. 1538, 114th Cong. (2015).
108. Fair Elections Now Act, S. 1538, at § 512(b).
109. Fair Elections Now Act, S. 1538, at § 401(a).
110. Fair Elections Now Act, S. 1538, at §§ 101, 522, 523.
111. Fair Elections Now Act, S. 1538, at § 524(a).
112. Fair Elections Now Act, S. 1538, at § 524(c).
113. Restore Democracy Resolution, H.R. Res. 298, 114th Cong. (2015); H.R. Res.
336, 114th Cong. (2015). 
114. See Restore Democracy Resolution, H.R. Res. 298, at § 301; H.R. Res. 336, at
§ 1.
115. See H. Res. 298 (114th): Restore Democracy Resolution, GOVTRACK.US,
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/hres298 [https://perma.cc/4VP5-GJ4K]; H. 
Res. 336 (114th): Expressing the Sense of the House of Representatives Regarding the 
Need to Create a Small Donor and Public Finance System for Congressional Elections, 
72 ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol.  70:57
C. Current Implementation
The use of small-donor matching programs similar in 
structure to current federal legislation has been rare.  Though 
only fourteen states and multiple large municipalities have 
programs on the books, they have yet to be utilized enough to 
develop measurable data points.116 Montgomery County, 
Maryland, which encompasses Bethesda, Silver Springs, and 
Rockville (home to the most expensive congressional seat in the 
nation) passed a small-donor matching bill in 2014 for 
candidates seeking public office.117  However, political 
resistance led to the program going unfunded.118 
New York City also has a voluntary small-donor matching 
program.119  The program, like those proposed in Congress, 
offers a 600% matching of public funds.120  However, unlike the 
legislative proposals, the New York City system does not come 
with strong reform mechanisms.  Both joint fundraising and 
political committees, such as PACs, are still allowed as viable 
sources of funding for candidates who opt into the system.121  
The most robust reforms in the New York City system are 
focused on campaign spending.  Specifically, the reforms act as 
back-end regulations for large dollar contributions.122  Although 
capped expenditures offer some protection from influence, 
campaigns are still free to accept donations (for the most part) 
from a variety of different entities.123 
GOVTRACK.US, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/hres336 
[https://perma.cc/F4SD-7AJP]. 
116. Editorial Bd., A Montgomery County Campaign Finance Bill Empowers Small
Donors, WASH. POST (Sept. 13, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/a-
montgomery-county-campaign-finance-bill-that-empowers-small-
donors/2014/09/13/33fdaac8-3ac7-11e4-8601-97ba88884ffd_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/VK77-5RSQ]. 
117. MONTGOMERY, MD., CTY. CODE art. IV, §§ 16-19, -23 (2014).
118. Emily Scarr, Campaign Update: Funding Fair Elections in Montgomery
County, MD. PIRG: BLOG (Apr. 6, 2015), 
http://www.marylandpirg.org/blogs/blog/mdp/campaign-update-funding-fair-elections-
montgomery-county [https://perma.cc/VK43-MQ53]. 
119. N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FIN. BD., CAMPAIGN FINANCE HANDBOOK: 2017 ELECTION
CYCLE v-vi (2d ed. 2015). 
120. Id. at vi.
121. N.Y.C., N.Y., CODE § 3-707(1) (2016); N.Y.C., N.Y., CODE § 3-715 (2016).
122. N.Y.C., N.Y., CODE § 3-706(1) (2016).
123. N.Y.C., N.Y., CODE § 3-703 (2016) (listing additional restrictions to which
candidates must adhere). 
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The reason these programs have survived post-Citizens 
United is that voluntary systems have been upheld as 
appropriate campaign finance reforms.124  Despite the fact that 
aspects of these programs have not survived, the bare framework 
remains viable.125  Restrictions on spending and some 
contribution limits remain illegal.  However, since Buckley v. 
Valeo, public funds matching programs have been 
constitutional.126  Additionally, restrictions on joint-committee 
fundraising remain allowed.127 
IV. WHAT DO WE SEEK TO ACHIEVE WITH
SMALL-DONOR MATCHING PROGRAMS AND 
HOW DO WE ACHIEVE IT? 
A. What Do We Seek to Achieve?
In reforming our campaign finance system, small-donor 
matching programs attempt to accomplish a number of 
important policy objectives.  By relying primarily on smaller 
contributions, do we incentivize the type of behavior that 
campaign finance reform efforts generally seek to achieve?  In 
other words, do these programs remove the influence of special 
interests in our elections? 
The answer is complicated.128  Small-donor matching 
programs rely on a number of different variables to function 
124. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 319 (2010).
125. Id.
126. See 424 U.S. 1, 143 (1976).
127. Id.
128. See Erinn Larkin, Benefits and Inequalities of Matching Funds, CFO
CONSULTING GROUP (Aug. 28, 2013) http://www.cfo-compliance.com/benefits-and-
inequalities-of-matching-funds/ [https://perma.cc/JDY3-338V]; Lee Drutman, What Ezra 
Klein Gets Wrong About Big vs. Small Money in Politics, SUNLIGHT FOUND. (May 10, 
2013, 1:41 PM), https://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2013/05/10/big-vs-small-money-in-
politics/ [https://perma.cc/PN45-PV89] (responding to Ezra Klein, Small Donors May 
Make Politics Even Worse, BLOOMBERGVIEW (May 8, 2013, 6:00 PM), 
http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2013-05-08/small-donors-may-make-politics-
even-worse [https://perma.cc/8K9L-64Z7]); Bradley A. Smith, Campaign Finance 
Regulation: Faulty Assumptions and Undemocratic Consequences, CATO INST.: CATO 
POL’Y ANALYSIS NO. 238 (Sept. 13, 1995), https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-
analysis/campaign-finance-regulation-faulty-assumptions-undemocratic-consequences 
[https://perma.cc/ERQ3-LC7U].  See generally Michael J. Malbin et al., Small Donors, Big 
Democracy: New York City’s Matching Funds as a Model for the Nation and States, 11 
ELECTION L.J. 3 (2012) (determining that small donor matching funds increase the number 
of donors who give and diversity of donating groups, and that this greater civic 
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properly.129  In creating a working system, legislatures have to 
determine which policies to further and which to leave behind.130  
Often times, there are no clear answers at the time laws are 
written.131  Additionally, what may work in one setting may not 
further the same policy objectives in another.132  For instance, in 
Boulder, Colorado, public funds come directly from the city’s 
budget, while in Suffolk County, New York, the public funds 
are sourced from private donations to an elections fund.133  
Austin, Texas, employs a hybrid system that borrows from both 
Boulder and Suffolk.134  Therefore, the creation of a small-donor 
system on a national scale is a difficult endeavor. 
Amplifying the influence of the average small donor is one 
of the foundational policy objectives of these programs.135  By 
sextupling a voter’s single contribution, an individual 
experiences a magnification of their “political voice” or 
influence.136  If we measure “political voice” as amount of 
donation per person, certainly a system that turns a ten dollar 
contribution to a seventy dollar contribution with no additional 
expense to the voter is one that creates a sixty dollar net gain of 
“political voice.”  On an individual basis, such a gain may be 
participation benefits civil society); David A. Primo, What Does Research Say About 
Public Funding for Political Campaigns? (2010) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://ij.org/report/what-does-research-say-about-public-funding-for-political-campaigns/ 
[https://perma.cc/FXN6-KPUR] (arguing that there is no evidence that “special interest” 
influence is reduced through public funding). 
129. The Key Decisions of a Small Donor Matching Program with Examples from
Various Cities, ILL. CAMPAIGN FOR POL. REFORM, http://www.ilcampaign.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/07/Key-Decisions-of-a-Small-Donor-Matching-Program.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/D9KU-Z76J] (listing the key decisions that must be made in small donor 
matching programs: which offices/elections are covered, the level of matching per 
contribution, the overall limit per office, to open or close the system, candidate 
qualifications, millionaire/PAC triggers, funding sources, and other requirements for 
candidates who opt-in). 
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. The Key Decisions of a Small Donor Matching Program with Examples from
Various Cities, supra note 129 (noting that candidates who opt into Austin’s small-donor 
program are also required to participate in mandatory debates). 
135. ELISABETH GENN ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, DONOR DIVERSITY
THROUGH PUBLIC MATCHING FUNDS 4, 9, 12-13, 16 (2012), 
http://www.brennancenter.org/publication/donor-diversity-through-public-matching-funds 
[https://perma.cc/4YRQ-2PZR]. 
136. Id. at 4.
2017] VIABILITY OF THE SMALL DONOR 75
more of a moral victory as opposed to a paradigm shifting 
contribution.  Candidates who opt into small-donor matching 
programs can still accept large donations.137  In theory a $700 
contribution from a prominent businessman would have the 
same political voice as a $100/$700 matched contribution from 
an inconsequential voter.  However, such a scenario ignores 
reality.  It is much more likely that the prominent businessman’s 
political voice will be stronger than that of the small donor’s.  
This is because the prominent businessman can offer the 
candidate services and access an average citizen cannot.  The 
businessman is more likely than the small donor to have the 
economic means to donate again.  Additionally, he is 
presumably part of a larger network of prominent 
businesspeople who could also be potential contribution sources 
to a campaign.  Many small donors do not have such utility. 
On a larger scale, the calculus changes.138  Seven $100 
donations that are then matched certainly have a greater 
monetary value than one $700 contribution.  If our goal is to 
raise the amount of donation per person as a way to increase that 
person’s influence in the system, then small-donor matching 
programs achieve this.  However, this is a highly limited 
definition of influence.  The same type of individuals that are 
used as foils for current reforms will still max out contributions 
to a candidate, regardless of whether a candidate has agreed to 
participate in a small-donor matching program.139  Such a system 
does not affect donors who contribute over the threshold amount 
of money that qualifies as a donation for public fund 
matching.140 
137. ANGELA MIGALLY & SUSAN LISS, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, SMALL
DONOR MATCHING FUNDS: THE NYC ELECTION EXPERIENCE 4 (2010), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/Small%20Donor%20Matching%2
0Funds-The%20NYC%20Election%20Experience.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y2RW-JDT7]. 
138. Malbin et al., supra note 128, at 13-16.
139. Reena Flores, George Clooney Talks “Obscene” Money in Politics, CBS NEWS
(Apr. 17, 2016, 1:29 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/george-clooney-political-
fundraisers-cost-an-obscene-amount-of-money [https://perma.cc/8F69-4FEG].  But see Ted 
Johnson, Hillary Clinton Raises Huge Sums at Homes of George Clooney, Jeffrey 
Katzenberg, VARIETY (Apr. 16, 2016, 5:12 PM), 
http://www.variety.com/2016/biz/news/hillary-clinton-george-clooney-fundraiser-jeffery-
katzenberg-1201755147/ [https://perma.cc/5AN6-BG7L]. 
140. Libby Watson, How Political Megadonors Can Give Almost $500,000 with a
Single Check, SUNLIGHT FOUND. (June 1, 2016, 11:44 PM),
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If the aim is to amplify a small donor’s political voice 
against a different source of financial influence, matching 
systems gain more legitimacy.  By opting into such a system 
with the same structure as the proposed federal legislation, 
candidates bar themselves from accepting money or support 
from joint fundraising committees and political action 
committees (this is not entirely truthful, more on this in the 
following section).141  If the aim of small-donor programs is to 
push back against joint-fundraising committees, then the 
maximization of voters’ political voices may matter less, overall, 
than some of the other legislative restrictions built into the 
program.  Viewed this way, small-donor matching through 
public funds seems to incentivize candidates to agree to these 
other financial restrictions.  Absent such an incentive, no 
reasonable candidate would agree to limit political contributions 
without a counter-benefit. 
Another primary aim of small-donor matching programs is 
to boost electoral participation.142  This can be achieved in a 
two-fold way.143  First, as argued above, boosting the influence 
(perceived or not) of small donors encourages a greater ease of 
access among voters.144  This raises the diversity in the donor 
base.145  Second, small-donor matching programs push 
candidates to form larger constituencies.146  The idea here is that 
by magnifying donations on a six to one ratio, a candidate will 
actively seek this type of financial support.147  This makes sense 
in light of the additional fundraising restrictions of these 
programs.148 
The above policy, however, suffers from a faulty 
assumption.  Although we may seek to achieve greater electoral 
https://sunlightfoundation.com/2016/06/01/how-political-megadonors-can-give-almost-
500000-with-a-single-check/ [https://perma.cc/GNS4-X5M3]. 
141. Towards a Small Donor Democracy in the District of Columbia: Policy
Components of a Small Donor Campaign Finance System, CITIZEN, 
http://citizen.org/documents/DC%20Small%20Donor%20Matching%20Funds-
The%20NYC%20Election%20Experience.pdf [https://perma.cc/37XY-VJFW]. 
142. MIGALLY & LISS, supra note 137, at 1.
143. Id. at 6-21.
144. Id. at 7-8.
145. GENN ET AL., supra note 135, at 4.
146. MIGALLY & LISS, supra note 137, at 6, 11-13.
147. Id. at 4, 14.
148. Id. at 7.
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participation through small-donor matching programs, does 
amplifying the political voice of a voter really correlate to an 
increase in ballots cast?149  The answer, at least in part, does not 
support this assumption.150  In 2009, voter turnout in the New 
York City mayoral election reached an all-time low.151  Four 
years later, in 2013, voter turnout was down even more.152  Both 
elections saw candidates utilize the city’s small-donor matching 
programs.153  This suggests that small-donor matching programs, 
or at least the core mechanisms of the programs that activate 
contribution matching through public funds, do not boost 
electoral participation. 
Total vote numbers, however, do not explain the whole 
picture.  While the number of ballots cast may have been at 
historic lows, participation in communities not normally 
engaged in the electoral process have risen.154  There is evidence 
to suggest traditionally minority neighborhoods in New York 
City participated more, at least financially, when small-donor 
matching programs were in place.155  In the majority-minority 
Bedford Stuyvesant neighborhood, contribution numbers were 
eleven times greater in elections with small-donor matching 
programs than in elections without such programs during the 
2009-2010 cycle.156  The same neighborhood saw a 100% 
increase in the number of participating voters (from 11% to 
22%) in New York City’s mayoral Democratic primary between 
149. Another argument is whether or not this should be the intended effect of small-
donor matching programs.  Perhaps political voice is less quantifiable than we would like 
to assume.  Can this amplification shape the policy and dialogue of a campaign without a 
complimentary increase in votes?  
150. Larkin, supra note 128; Sam Roberts, New York: Voter Turnout Appears to Be
Record Low, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6 2013, 10:06 AM), 
http://www.nytimes.com/news/election-2013/2013/11/06/new-york-turnout-appears-
headed-for-record-low/?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/5ZQX-9L6F]. 
151. Larkin, supra note 128.
152. Roberts, supra note 150.
153. N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FIN. BD., BY THE PEOPLE: THE NEW YORK CITY CAMPAIGN 
FINANCE PROGRAM IN THE 2013 ELECTIONS 44-46 (2014), 
http://www.nyccfb.info/PDF/per/2013_PER/2013_PER.pdf [https://perma.cc/X6DG-
2CRP]. 
154. N.Y.C. Bd. Of Elections, Statement and Return Report for Certification,
General Election 2013, 
http://vote.nyc.ny.us/downloads/pdf/results/2013/2013GeneralElection/00001100000Cityw
ide%20Mayor%20Citywide%20Recap.pdf [https://perma.cc/QRG7-YP8R]. 
155. GENN ET AL., supra note 135, at 14-15.
156. Id. at 18.
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2009 and 2013.157  During this time, other New York minority-
majority neighborhoods experienced similar increases in voter 
participation.  In Chinatown, contributions were eight times 
greater while voting increased 72.8% (from 14% to 24.2%).158  
In Harlem and the Bronx, contributions were three times greater 
while voting increased by an average of over 100% in both 
areas.159 
The data here emphasizes the disparity between majority-
minority neighborhoods and non-minority neighborhoods.  
Small-donor matching programs appear to boost voter turnout in 
areas traditionally removed from the electoral process.160  This 
seems to fulfill one of the main policy objectives of these 
programs.161  However, in viewing this data, one should keep in 
mind that correlation between an increase in contributions under 
a small-donor matching program and an increase in electoral 
participation may not mean that an increase in participation was 
specifically caused by such a program.  The reality is that while 
these trends suggest that small-donor matching programs do 
boost voter turnout, the sample size is small. 
157. Ctr. for Urban Research & CUNY Graduate Sch. of Journalism, Public Use
Microdata Area/PUMA 4003: Covering the Bedford Stuyvesant Neighborhood(s) in 
Brooklyn, NYC ELECTION ATLAS, http://www.electionatlas.nyc/tables.html 
[https://perma.cc/CK36-ZXS8].  This is an interactive database of election results sortable 
by many different variables.  Here the data is sorted for the Bedford Stuyvesant 
neighborhood.  Select “By Community Area” tab; then select “Brooklyn – Bedford 
Stuyvesant.” 
158. Ctr. for Urban Research & CUNY Graduate Sch. of Journalism, Public Use
Microdata Area/PUMA 3809: Covering the Lower East Side/Chinatown Neighborhood(s) 
in Manhattan, NYC ELECTION ATLAS, http://www.electionatlas.nyc/tables.html 
[https://perma.cc/CK36-ZXS8].  This is an interactive database of election results sortable 
by many different variables.  Here the data is sorted for the Chinatown neighborhood. 
Select “By Community Area” tab; then select “Manhattan – Lower East Side/Chinatown.” 
159. Ctr. for Urban Research & CUNY Graduate Sch. of Journalism, Public Use
Microdata Area/PUMA 3708: Covering the Highbridge/South Concourse Neighborhood(s) 
in Bronx, NYC ELECTION ATLAS, http://www.electionatlas.nyc/tables.html 
[https://perma.cc/CK36-ZXS8].  This is an interactive database of election results sortable 
by many different variables.  Here the data is sorted for the Bronx and Harlem (Northern 
Manhattan) neighborhoods.  For Bronx, select “By Community Area” tab; then select 
“Bronx – Highbridge/South Concourse.”  For Harlem, select “By Community Area” tab; 
then select “Manhattan – Central Harlem” and select “By Community Area” tab; then 
select “Manhattan – East Harlem.” 
160. STEVEN M. LEVIN, CTR. FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, KEEPING IT CLEAN:
PUBLIC FINANCING IN AMERICAN ELECTIONS 11 (2006). 
161. MIGALLY & LISS, supra note 137, at 13.
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Finally, of the major policy objectives that small-donor 
matching programs seek to achieve, ensuring a greater ease of 
electoral access for non-prominent candidates is the most readily 
quantifiable.  Minority candidates, those without large 
institutional support, directly benefit from programs that match 
small donations with public funds.162  These candidates include 
candidates of non-majority race and ethnicities, women, young 
candidates, and candidates without strong financials.163  Looking 
back at New York City’s mayoral contests, the wide variety of 
candidates in both party primary competitions and the general 
elections suggest that public funds matching programs increase 
access for non-prominent candidates.164 
If our aim is to induce a greater number of candidates to 
run for office, small-donor matching programs certainly achieve 
this objective.165  With more candidates entering into contests, a 
greater number of different ideas enter into the electoral 
conversation.166  With a greater number of choices, voters have 
an increased ability to vote for a candidate that matches their 
ideals.167  Conversely, having more candidates does not 
necessarily equate to having more unique viewpoints.  An 
increase in number is no guarantee for an increase in 
independent policies.  Additionally, political leanings may not 
align with party affiliation.  For instance, in the 2013 New York 
City Mayoral election, candidate Tom Allon declared as a 
Democrat, withdrew and declared as a Republican, and was later 
nominated by the Liberal Party as their candidate.168 
162. LEVIN, supra note 160, at 5, 7.
163. LEVIN, supra note 160, at 5-7.
164. N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FIN. BD., NEW YORKERS MAKE THEIR VOICES HEARD: A
REPORT ON THE 2009 ELECTIONS 2, 5, 11 (2010), 
http://www.nyccfb.info/PDF/per/2009_PER/2009PostElectionReport.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/CCN3-DXYV]. 
165. MIMI MARZIANA ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, MORE THAN 
COMBATING CORRUPTION: THE OTHER BENEFITS OF PUBLIC FINANCING 2 (2011), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/more-combating-corruption-other-benefits-public-
financing [https://perma.cc/976S-DNMM]. 
166. Id. at 4.
167. Id. at 6, 8.
168. Michael M. Grynbaum, Allon Exits Race for New York Mayor, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 18, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/19/nyregion/allon-drops-out-of-race-
for-new-york-mayor.html [https://perma.cc/MU3C-32DV]. 
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Additionally, this policy is not without negatives.  A few 
have argued that small-donor matching programs excessively 
favor more well-known candidates.169  The argument follows 
that these candidates receive a greater financial benefit through 
name recognition.170  Additionally, even candidates who are 
extremely popular with low-income populations derive the 
majority of their support from a small cadre of wealthy 
donors.171 
The negatives, however, rely on their own set of faulty 
assumptions.  Well-known politicians, those with name 
recognition, will derive the same benefit regardless of 
participation in a small-donor matching program.  While these 
candidates will still receive matching public funds, this criticism 
ignores the specific rationale behind these programs.  The aim of 
these programs is to allow for greater ease of access, not limit 
the amount of small-donor money entering campaigns.  
Although the total amount of money raised increases, so does 
the percentage of money coming from small contributions.  
Thus, even a small donation to a well-known candidate advances 
the underlying principles of campaign finance reform. 
B. How Do We Achieve It?
Up until now, the discussion has focused solely on small-
donor matching programs.  These programs have a wide variety 
of mechanisms all aimed at reforming campaign finance in some 
way. However, are these methods appropriate?  What 
implementation obstacles do small-donor matching programs 
face?  Are there better alternatives?  While the discussion so far 
has centered on municipal and state races, the legislation 
currently in Congress focuses on House and Senate races.  In 
light of a robust discussion on whether such programs can be 
implemented on a national level for presidential races, the 
discussion that follows is meant to track these larger elections. 
The most prominent aspect of any small-donor matching 
program is the program’s reliance on public funds.  As 
previously discussed above, public funds matching achieves a 
169. Smith, supra note 128, at 8-9.
170. Id. at 9.
171. Id.
2017] VIABILITY OF THE SMALL DONOR 81
variety of policy objectives.  Is it, however, in and of itself, good 
policy?  In the abstract, as a distinct and separate reform 
mechanism, public funds matching is beneficial as a reform.  In 
reality, these programs exist with other controls, such as caps on 
campaign spending.  Taken together, these programs face a 
number of significant implementation hurdles. 
An essential part of formulating good policy is determining 
how to implement it.  In order for small-donor matching 
programs to have any meaningful affect, they must be executed 
in a way that leads to their long-term survival.  Oftentimes, 
implementation mechanisms are built into legislation.172  
However, ill thought-out mechanisms can lead to the complete 
inefficacy of a program.173  Therefore, it is important to analyze 
how to achieve the policy behind small-donor matching 
programs in conjunction with a discussion on what the policy 
be.  These two ideas are not mutually exclusive and impact each 
other in many ways. 
First, public funds matching programs cannot control the 
amount of large dollar contributions a candidate receives.  
Although it is constitutional to cap expenditure limits for those 
who voluntarily opt into a matching program, one cannot 
constitutionally lower donor contribution limits.174  If the goal is 
removing the undue influence that large donors exert, small-
donor matching programs may not be the best solution.  
Although the influence of small donors is elevated, large donor 
influence is not removed.  Additionally, while candidates are 
barred from holding a direct leadership position with political 
action committees, there is no constitutional bar for their 
independent operation.175  PACs and Super PACs can function to 
support any candidate, regardless of whether the candidate has 
opted into a small-donor matching program. 
If neither large donations nor PAC activity is reigned in, 
are small-donor programs really that effective?  After Citizens 
United, restrictions on these activities are definitively 
172. See Fair Elections Now Act, S. 1538, 114th Cong. §§ 531(a), (c)-(e) (2015);
Government by the People Act of 2014, H.R. 20, 113th Cong. § 111 (2014). 
173. Scarr, supra note 118.
174. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 319, 339 (2010).
175. Id. at 337.
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unconstitutional.176  In this sense, these programs are necessarily 
blunted.  There is little we can do, legislatively, to limit 
contribution limits.  However, the next best thing—the objective 
small-donor matching programs seek to achieve—is elevating 
the political voice of the average donor.  Though it may not be 
the best way, it may be the only way to indirectly minimize the 
influence of PACs and large donors. 
Second, these programs have negative effects on other 
aspects of the electoral process.  Restrictions on coordination 
with joint committees hurt local and state candidates who rely 
on joint-committee funds during general elections.  While 
removing coordination removes the “loophole” that allows 
donors to essentially donate twice to a specific candidate, it also 
lowers the ability of joint committees (like the DNC’s “Victory 
Fund”) to support down-ballot races.177  The effect of the 
removal of the loophole is considerable: for the 2016 
Democratic presidential candidates, the maximum donation 
totals to $2,700 while a “Victory Fund” maximum donation 
totals to $360,000 per calendar year.178 
One can certainly see the pushback against joint 
committees that can raise $360,000 a year from any one person.  
However, not all money goes to the specific candidate who is in 
coordination with the joint committee.179  For 2016, at maximum 
contribution levels, a specific Democratic presidential campaign 
would only receive $5,400, while national and state parties 
receive the remainder in different amounts.180  Since joint-
committee fundraising is propelled by candidates, banning such 
activity reduces the money that flows into national and state 
parties.  This money ultimately supports general election 
candidates on a local, state, and national level.  In presidential 
elections, joint-committee fundraising contributes a non-
176. Id. at 353-57.
177. The term “loophole” is used loosely here to describe a means of working
around the system, not of any illegality. 
178. Fed. Election Comm’n, Citizens’ Guide, FED. ELECTION COMMISSION,
http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/citizens.shtml [https://perma.cc/PT78-H7CL]; Peter 
Overby, How Hillary Clinton Could Ask a Single Donor for Over $700,000, NPR POL. 
(Dec. 23, 2015, 5:03 AM), http://www.npr.org/2015/12/23/460762853/how-hillary-clinton-
could-ask-a-single-donor-for-over-700-000 [https://perma.cc/4RQJ-YW75]. 
179. Overby, supra note 178.
180. Id.
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negligible amount of money to these national and state parties.181  
By removing coordination between joint-committees and 
candidates, small-donor matching programs weaken efforts to 
elect additional candidates from the same party.  When 
formulating legislation, lawmakers must balance the desire to 
support their respective party against the desire to pass effective 
campaign finance reforms. 
Third, there are clear First Amendment restrictions to the 
implementation of small-donor matching programs.  After 
Citizens United, legislation must be formulated carefully to 
avoid violating robust free speech protections.182  Although 
making the system voluntary removes some of the concerns 
around limiting political speech, these programs create potential 
inequities.  Problems arise when one candidate opts into a small-
donor matching program while another one does not.  At this 
point, while one candidate is free to raise and spend how she 
wants, the other is limited.  While they may have done so 
voluntarily, they did so understanding that other candidates 
would play by the same rules.183  The incentives that come with 
these programs would suggest full participation (on current local 
and state levels).  However, when expanded to a national level, 
full participation by candidates does not offer the same 
incentives as they do in smaller races.  For instance, joint 
fundraising committees become more powerful.  Considering 
this, there is an argument that the inequalities existing between 
participating and not participating in such a program are too 
strong to overcome constitutionally. 
A fourth concern centers around the public costs of such a 
program.  Taxpayers would undoubtedly be affected.184  On a 
federal and national level, such costs could be immense.185 
Current legislation in Congress has built-in, revenue-neutral 
181. Matea Gold & Tom Hamburger, Democratic Party Fundraising Effort Helps
Clinton Find New Donors, Too, WASH. POST (Feb. 20, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/democratic-party-fundraising-effort-helps-
clinton-find-new-donors-too/2016/02/19/b8535cea-d68f-11e5-b195-
2e29a4e13425_story.html [https://perma.cc/7WWZ-5MWZ]. 
182. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 319 (2010).
183. See generally Ganesh Sitaraman, Contracting Around Citizens United, 114
COLUM. L. REV. 755 (2014) (providing an in-depth view of how candidates enter into 
voluntary agreements to circumvent Citizens United). 
184. Smith, supra note 128, at 13.
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provisions.186  However, these provisions will be subject to 
heavy revisions if such legislation advances towards 
promulgation.187  The bills actually acknowledge this—built into 
the text are tax credits.188  While a credit may not fully 
counteract an anticipated tax increase, it does stand to serve 
some compensatory interest.  This compensatory interest has to 
come from somewhere, regardless of the bill being revenue-
neutral.  Implementation costs will, more likely than not, call for 
some monetary consideration from taxpayers. 
In light of this, are small-donor matching programs a viable 
solution?  The answer is undoubtedly an affirmative one.  
Within the current legal and judicial landscape, small-donor 
matching programs stand as one of the best solutions to wide 
reaching campaign finance problems.  Although negative 
externalities may be created by such a program’s 
implementation, the positives far outweigh the costs.  Small-
donor matching programs boost electoral participation on both 
sides of the ballot (candidates and voters).  They also amplify 
the political voice of the average donor.  Though state and 
national parties may be weakened through the ban on joint-
committee coordination, joint-committees can still fundraise in a 
variety of different ways.  However, when candidates truly 
invest time in creating policies that affect their broader and 
diverse constituencies, state and federal parties win on a more 
meaningful level. 
V. CONCLUSION
Campaign finance reform has a long and unique history 
within this country.  Small-donor matching programs are just 
one of many different aspects within a larger effort to reform our 
electoral process.  These programs boost participation among a 
diverse set of constituencies.  They encourage greater 
involvement in the political process and a greater moral 
investment in the election of candidates that best reflect a voter’s 
ideals.  Small-donor programs elevate the political voice of the 
average voter, which encourages candidates to work directly 
186. Fair Elections Now Act, S. 1538, 114th Cong. § 501(e) (2015).
187. See supra note 88.
188. Government by the People Act, H.R. 20, 113th Cong. § 101 (2015); Fair
Elections Now Act, S. 1538, at § 501(e). 
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with their constituencies and not just wealthy influencers.  
Although these programs may not be the best solution in 
abstract, within our current campaign finance framework, they 
are the best chance for meaningful reform. 
